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This edited collection was motivated by an interest in understanding how to improve Bayesian
reasoning. In that sense, the book before you is pragmatically and prescriptively oriented. Several
of the papers address that challenge and some pick up on the important question of why certain
factors work as well as they do. However, Improving Bayesian Reasoning: What Works and Why
offers more than its editors had bargained for or its title suggests. Many papers offer methodological
and conceptual insights that should help readers understand the psychology of Bayesian reasoning
as practiced in cognitive science.
The book is comprised of 23 papers by 48 authors. The contributions are ordered by type: 10
original research articles first, followed by three reviews and 10 shorter essays. Foregoing an attempt
to summarize each contribution in sufficient detail, let us simply draw out some observations about
the collection.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLES
This collection extends the base of original research on Bayesian reasoning in many important
ways. Several papers offer further empirical evidence of the advantage of using visualized natural
frequencies to communicate statistical information. Hoffrage et al. (2015b) show that the benefits
of natural frequency representations in Bayesian tasks generalize from single- to multiple-cue cases
and also to cases involvingmore than two hypotheses. Mandel (2015) shows that brief instruction in
Bayesian reasoning using natural-frequency trees improves the coherence of intelligence analysts’
posterior probability estimates. Binder et al. (2015) find that performance is improved when
statistical information is communicated as natural frequencies instead of probabilities, and the
natural-frequency format strengthens the facilitative effect of nested-set visualizations (i.e., tree
diagrams and contingency tables) on Bayesian reasoning.
Other contributions identify where facilitative factors have their greatest impact. For instance,
Hoffrage et al. (2015a) find that inexperienced businessmajors benefitmore fromnatural-frequency
formats than experienced business managers. Garcia-Retamero et al. (2015) address questions of
where and why by showing that grid representations of natural frequencies facilitate Bayesian
reasoning more strongly in medical patients with low numeracy, and that representational effects
on reasoning are mediated bymetacognitive judgment calibration. Hafenbrädl and Hoffrage (2015)
go even further by parameterizing Bayesian skill using quantitative and qualitative factors that
were free to vary across earlier studies. Finally, by triangulating choice and process data using
an ecological sampling approach, Domurat et al. (2015) observe that many ostensibly Bayesian
responses follow from use of an alternative statistical integration strategy.
The study of deduction had long been associated with reasoning from certain premises to certain
conclusions. Yet Evans et al. (2015) and Cruz et al. (2015) venture into relatively new territory by
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examining the quality of reasoners’ uncertain deductions using
coherence-based Bayesian metrics such as probabilistic validity.
These papers capture the fundamental insight that, even in
deduction, most arguments consist of uncertain premises from
which uncertain conclusions are drawn.
Finally, the contribution by Douven and Schupbach (2015) is
pragmatic in two unique senses. First, it causes us to reconsider
whether Bayesianism is the most appropriate normative
framework in some contexts. Second, in the tradition of the
great American pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce, it situates
abduction within the normative fold. The authors argue that
explanationist alternatives to Bayesianism not only withstand
normative critiques, they also fare better descriptively.
REVIEW ARTICLES AND ESSAYS
The articles in this category draw out several dominant themes.
First, the debate over natural frequencies vs. nested sets is
passé. Although disagreement over the merits of the evolutionary
account within which the original natural-frequency arguments
were put forth linger, there is wide consensus that natural-
frequency formats improve Bayesian performance by clarifying
nested-set relations, which confers both representational and
computational benefits (Brase and Hill, 2015).
Second, there has been a move away from the dual-systems
account that emphasized System 1 sources of Bayesian error
(Barbey and Sloman, 2007) toward a view that regards such
errors as primarily due to representational and computational
breakdowns in a problem-solving process, which occur even
when explicit “System 2” processes are utilized (Johnson
and Tubau, 2015; Sirota et al., 2015). For example, Juslin
(2015) illustrates that Bayesian performance improves when
computational requirements are shifted from multiplicative
integration to additive integration. Likewise, Girotto and Pighin
(2015) review studies showing that children and preliterate adults
exhibit extensional reasoning that enables them to solve Bayesian
problems provided they do not require explicit mathematical
computation. The emerging view is further tempered by
considerations of task characteristics, which are likely to alter
the balance of implicit and explicit cognitive processes (Vallée-
Tourangeau et al., 2015).
Whereas, most papers in this collection focus on Bayesian
reasoners’ performance, two refocus our attention on Bayesian
communication by experts. Navarrete et al. (2014) make us
consider how parents’ decision-making about prenatal screening
might be altered if they were given the positive predictive
value (namely, the Bayesian value) of the initial screening test
(which happens to be quite low) and also if parents received
clear communications about the probabilistic risks of secondary
invasive testing. Navarrete et al. (2015) generalize the argument,
recommending that, where feasible, medical practitioners should
give clients the relevant positive predictive values adjusted for
their reference class. In short, clients should be relieved of
computational burdens as far as possible so that they can focus
on value-based decisions among available options.
Finally, several papers in this collection take the literature to
task. Mandel (2014a) and McNair (2015) note that the definition
of Bayesian reasoning in most psychological studies is mainly
about information-integration performance. Few studies even
require subjects to revise or update their beliefs! Others point to
a lack of due attention to individual differences in reasoning and
to the cognitive processes that lead to final estimates (Johnson
and Tubau, 2015; McNair, 2015; Vallée-Tourangeau et al.,
2015). Baratgin (2015) and Mandel (2014a) both take Bayesian
researchers to task over their disregard of the subjectivist (and
coherence-centered) foundations of Bayesianism.
However, attention to problems that have a temporal
component is not lacking in this collection: Tubau et al. (2015)
provide an insightful and comprehensive review of the Monty
Hall Problem and Baratgin (2015) uses the two-player version of
that problem to expose logical and terminological breakdowns in
earlier theoretical analyses. Mandel (2014b) explores the perhaps
even more complex Sleeping Beauty problem, which involves
belief revision under conditions of asynchrony, to highlight how
visual representations using quasi-logic trees can help clarify
points of philosophical disagreement in the literature.
We hope readers will find this book informative, thought
provoking, and of practical value.
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